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THE	PRECRITICAL	USE	OF	THE	METAPHOR	OF	EPIGENESIS	
	
Claude	Piché,	Université	de	Montréal	
	
	
La	seule	génération	des	corps	vivants	et	organisés	est	l'abîme	de	
l'esprit	humain.	Rousseau,	Emile.	
	
	 In	the	last	few	decades,	a	lot	of	attention	has	been	directed	towards	the	
interpretation	of	the	metaphor	of	epigenesis	in	§27	of	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason.		In	the	
Kant-Studien	alone,	there	are	three	articles	especially	devoted	to	the	analysis	of	the	
analogical	use	of	this	term	stemming	from	natural	history.1		This	exegetical	work	is	not	only	
required	because	Kant	does	not	explicitly	state	in	which	sense	this	analogy	must	be	taken,	
but	also	because	of	its	strategic	importance.		In	fact,	in	the	second	edition	§27	represents	
the	last	section	of	the	Transcendental	Deduction	and	it	aims	at	reiterating	the	"results"	of	
the	whole	deduction	of	the	concepts	of	the	understanding.		The	commentators	have	also	
convincingly	shown	that	the	metaphor	of	epigenesis,	as	opposed	to	the	two	other	biological	
metaphors	introduced	by	Kant	on	this	occasion,	viz.	generatio	aequivoca	and	preformation,	
is	perfectly	suited	to	express	the	Copernican	Revolution	that	takes	place	within	the	
Deduction.		In	other	words,	epigenesis	captures	the	central	issue	of	the	Critique	in	that	it	
illustrates	the	productive	role	of	the	understanding	in	the	constitution	of	experience.	
	 To	be	sure,	Kant	did	not	wait	until	1787	to	make	use	of	intellectual	epigenesis	in	his	
philosophy.		For	instance,	there	are	many	occurrences	of	this	metaphor	in	the	Reflexionen	
on	metaphysics	of	the	seventies.		I	shall	argue	in	what	follows	that	the	recourse	made	to	
epigenesis	during	that	period	does	not	correspond	exactly	to	the	one	that	we	find	in	§27.		If	
by	"critical"	philosophy	one	understands	the	solution	to	the	problem	of	the	validity	of	the	
pure	concepts	of	the	understanding,	or	in	other	words	if	critical	philosophy	starts	with	the	
elaboration	of	an	answer	to	the	question	raised	in	the	1772	letter	to	Markus	Herz	
																																																																				
1	See	J.	Wubnig,	"The	Epigenesis	of	Pure	Reason.		A	Note	on	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	B,	
sec.	27,	165-168,"	Kant-Studien	60	(1969):	147-152.		A.	C.	Genova,	"Kant's	Epigenesis	of	
Pure	Reason,"	Kant-Studien	65	(1974):	259-273.		Hans	Werner	Ingensiep,	"Die	biologischen	
Analogien	und	die	erkenntnistheoretischen	Alternativen	in	Kants	Kritik	der	reinen	
Vernunft	B	§	27,"	Kant-Studien	85	(1994):	381-393.		See	also	Timothy	Lenoir,	"Kant,	
Blumenbach,	and	Vital	Materialism	in	German	Biology,"	Isis	71	(1980):	77-108;	Wayne	
Waxman,	Kant's	Model	of	the	Mind.		A	New	Interpretation	of	Transcendental	Idealism	,	New	
York/Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1991.		
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concerning	the	relation	between	the	representation	and	the	object,	then	one	might	claim	
that	the	occurrences	of	epigenesis	in	the	Reflexionen	of	the	seventies	are	precritical	in	their	
intent.2		In	fact,	they	belong	to	the	problematic	of	the	Dissertation,	in	the	context	of	which	
the	first	epistemological	use	of	this	biological	concept	is	to	be	found.		These	occurrences	
concern	not	so	much	the	validity	of	the	concepts	of	the	understanding	as	the	explanation	of	
their	origin.		As	we	know,	one	of	the	main	goals	of	the	Dissertation	was	to	establish	that	the	
human	faculty	of	knowledge	has	a	set	of	pure	representations:	the	a	priori	intuitions	of	
space	and	time,	and	the	concepts	belonging	to	the	understanding	itself.		Even	though	the	
word	"epigenesis"	does	not	occur	as	such	in	the	Dissertation,	the	purpose	of	the	metaphor	
found	in	Kant's	private	papers	of	this	period	stems	precisely	from	the	need	to	provide	an	
answer	to	the	question	of	the	origin,	or	better,	of	the	genesis	of	these	pure	representations.		
In	this	text	of	1770,	the	pure	intuitions	of	space	and	time	and	the	concepts	of	the	
understanding	are	said	to	be	"acquired"	representations	rather	than	merely	"innate"	ones.			
	 We	shall	first	examine	the	metaphor	of	epigenesis	as	it	operates	in	§27	of	the	
Transcendental	Deduction	in	order	to	clarify	its	meaning	by	opposing	it	to	the	other	
biological	theories	also	introduced	by	Kant.		Second,	it	will	be	established	that	in	the	early	
sixties	Kant	already	takes	sides	with	the	biological	theory	of	epigenesis	as	opposed	to	the	
theory	of	the	preformation	of	the	embryo.		This	preference	is	dictated	by	a	broad	refusal	of	
any	version	of	pre-established	harmony,	a	stand	which	is	clearly	present	in	the	Dissertation.		
Third,	we	will	discover	that	the	Reflexionen	of	the	seventies	dealing	with	epigenesis	are	
meant	to	answer	the	question	of	the	origin	raised	by	the	Dissertation.		Last,	we	will	be	in	a	
position	to	return	to	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	in	order	to	see	how	the	"precritical"	
question	of	the	origin	of	the	concepts	of	the	understanding	has	been	carefully	integrated	
into	the	critical	project.	
	
1-The	Copernican	Revolution	interpreted	in	terms	of	epigenesis.	
	
	 Since	§27	of	the	first	Critique	has	been	the	object	of	careful	interpretation	in	
secondary	literature,	there	is	no	reason	here	to	renew	this	task.		Suffice	it	to	indicate	the	
main	purpose	of	Kant's	use	of	the	three	analogies	drawn	between	biology	and	the	
philosophical	problem	of	the	possibility	of	knowledge	a	priori.		In	order	to	show	that	he	has	
																																																																				
2	See	H.	J.	de	Vleeschauwer,	La	déduction	transcendantale	dans	l'oeuvre	de	Kant,	I	
(Antwerpen:	de	Sikkel,	1934),	153-154,	255.		L.	W.	Beck,	"Two	Ways	of	Reading	Kant's	
Letter	to	Herz,"	in	Kant's	Transcendental	Deductions,	ed.	Eckart	Förster	(Stanford,	Stanford	
University	Press,	1989),	21-26.	
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discussed	the	issue	at	stake	in	the	Transcendental	Deduction,	he	repeats	in	§27	the	
question	by	which	he	introduced	the	entire	discussion	earlier	on,	namely	the	question	of	
the	necessary	relation	that	prevails	between	a	representation	and	its	object.3		The	
alternative	was	whether	the	object	makes	the	representation	possible,	or	whether	the	
representation	makes	possible	its	own	object.		These	are	the	two	only	possible	options.		In	
fact,	the	first	alternative	must	be	excluded	from	the	start	because,	in	the	case	under	
consideration,	the	pure	concepts	of	the	understanding	which	are	needed	in	order	for	the	
experience	to	include	necessity	and	universality,	cannot	be	gained	from	the	empirical	
manifold.		This	is	the	empiricist	way	of	explaining	the	necessary	relationship	between	the	
representation	and	the	object,	and	Kant	depicts	the	contradiction	involved	in	this	way	of	
attaining	pure	concepts	in	terms	of	generatio	aequivoca.		The	expression	simply	refers	to	
the	antique	theory,	discarded	in	the	Critique	of	Judgment,	according	to	which	a	living	
organism	could	emerge	from	raw	inorganic	matter	along	mechanical	laws.4		It	is	as	
awkward	to	think	that	empirical	data	could	produce	a	pure	concept	as	it	is	to	think	that	
inorganic	matter	could	of	itself	give	birth	to	an	organism.	
	 As	we	know,	Kant	chooses	the	second	part	of	the	alternative	raised	in	the	inaugural	
question	of	the	Deduction	which	is	that	"the	categories	contain,	on	the	side	of	the	
understanding,	the	grounds	of	the	possibility	of	all	experience	in	general".5		This	is	what	in	
his	eyes	can	be	best	illustrated	(metaphorically)	"as	a	system,	as	it	were,	of	the	epigenesis	of	
pure	reason".		What	is	of	particular	interest	in	this	passage	is	that	immediately	after	Kant	
introduces	a	third	option	which	he	considers	to	be	a	"middle	course".		This	is	the	theory	
according	to	which	the	principles	of	the	understanding	are	innate	or	"implanted",	and	
correspond	to	the	objects	in	the	outside	world	on	the	basis	of	a	divine	predetermination.			
In	the	letter	to	Markus	Herz	of	February	21,	1772,	Kant	rightly	characterises	this	system	as	
harmonia	praestabilita	intellectualis	in	the	sense	that	God	has	provided,	in	advance,	the	
human	mind	with	principles	that	correspond	exactly	to	the	laws	ruling	the	processes	in	the	
world.6		In	his	letter,	Kant	attributes	this	theory	to	Crusius,	but	for	the	reader	of	the	Critique	
who	had	no	access	to	this	letter,	the	allusion	to	Crusius	in	the	Transcendental	Deduction	is	
																																																																				
3	Kant,	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft,	A	92/B	124-125.	
4	Kant,	Kritik	der	Urteilskraft,	§	80,	AK	V,	419.		See	J.	D.	McFarland,		Kant's	Concept	of	
Teleology	(Edinburgh,	University	of	Edinburgh	Press,	1970),	39.	
5	Kant,	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft,	B	167,	quoted	in	N.	Kemp	Smith's	translation.		
6	Kant,	Letter	to	Markus	Herz,	21	February	1772,	Briefwechsel,	AK.	X,	31.	
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clear	if	he	paid	attention	to	the	note	of	§36	of	the	Prolegomena	published	four	years	before	
the	second	edition	of	the	Critique.7	
	 The	implicit	reference	to	Crusius	and	to	his	theory	of	the	pre-established	harmony	
between	the	mind	and	the	world	is	interesting	insofar	as	it	gives	Kant	the	occasion	to	
confront	two	rival	biological	categories:	epigenesis	and	preformation.		For	the	18th	Century	
reader,	the	issues	related	to	both	theories	are	well	known,	and	Kant	indicates	here	a	
preference	for	epigenesist,	which	is	consistent	with	his	ideas	on	the	generation	of	life,	as	
we	shall	see	later.		For	the	moment,	let	us	briefly	sketch	the	claims	of	each	theory.		In	fact,	
the	theory	of	epigenesis	can	be	best	defined	in	opposition	to	preformation.		The	latter	is	the	
theory	of	generation	according	to	which		the	living	embryo	is	present	in	the	seeds	of	one	of	
the	two	parents.		Accordingly,	copulation	amounts	to	no	more	than	bringing	about	the	
gradual	development	of	a	living	organism	that	is	already	constituted,	if	only	on	a	
microscopic	scale.		Copulation	is	not	then	a	real	act	of	engendering	but	only	the	beginning	
of	the	unfolding	of	an	already	fully	constituted	organism.		This	means	that	all	future	life	is	
included	in	the	seeds	of	the	first	parents	of	every	species,	from	which	is	derived	the	
expression	"encasement"	(in	French	emboîtement)	referring	to	the	inclusion	in	the	parent	
of	all	future	generations,	such	that	every	individual	pops	out	in	the	course	of	history	like	a	
Russian	doll.		Conversely,	epigenesis	stipulates	that	new	characters	are	being	developed	in	
an	initially	undifferentiated	embryo.		This	means	that	a	new	individual	is	actually	produced	
by	mating	and	that	the	development	of	the	individual	will	bring	about	parts	or	characters	
that	were	not	present	as	such	in	the	embryo.		Kant,	who	had	been	long	acquainted	with	
these	diverging	theories,	defines	epigenesis	in	§81	of	the	Critique	of	Judgment	as	the	System	
der	Zeugungen	als	Produkte.		Hence,	if	"eduction"	is	the	term	that	he	uses	to	characterise	
preformationism,	"production"	is	the	word	that	best	describes	the	intention	behind	the	
metaphor	of	epigenesis.	
	 Since	the	concepts	and	principles	of	the	understanding,	according	to	Crusius,	are	
																																																																				
7	Kant,	Prolegomena,	§36,	AK	IV,	319:	"Crusius	alone	thought	of	a	compromise:	that	a	spirit,	
who	can	neither	err	nor	deceive,	implanted	these	laws	in	us	originally."		See	also	Refl.	§§	
4893	and	4894	(1776-1778),	AK	XVIII,	21-22,	and	Vorlesungen	über	Metaphysik	(L1),	AK	
XXVIII.1,	233.		Concerning	the	question	of	how	things	really	stand	for	Crusius	himself,	the	
picture	that	we	find	in	Wege	zur	Gewissheit...	is	not	as	sharp	as	Kant	presents	it,	when	he	
seems	to	use	Crusius'	theory	simply	as	a	model	to	be	discarded.		In	fact,	Crusius	in	his	text	
is	merely	conjecturing.		See	C.	A.	Crusius,	Wege	zur	Gewissheit	und	Zuverlässigkeit	der	
menschlichen	Erkenntnis	(1747;	rpt.	Hildesheim:	Olms,	1965),	154;	the	same,	Entwurf	der	
nothwendigen	Vernunft-Wahrheiten	(1745;	rpt.	Hildesheim,	1964),	113;	Martin	Krieger,	
Geist,	Welt	und	Gott	bei	Christian	August	Crusius	(Würzburg:	Königshausen	&	Neumann,	
1993),	160.	
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implanted	in	the	mind	so	as	to	regulate	the	course	of	its	representations,	the	necessity	
between	the	representation	of	a	cause	and	of	an	effect,	for	example,	can	only	be	"felt"	by	
consciousness;	that	is,	it	remains	a	subjective	necessity,	whose	truth,	as	a	picture	of	what	is	
going	on	in	the	world,	finds	its	justification	in	the	Creator	of	both	the	knowing	subject	and	
the	world.		On	the	other	hand,	the	advantage	of	transcendental	philosophy,	as	it	is	
expressed	by	the	analogy	with	epigenesis,	is	that	the	necessity	of	the	relation	between	
cause	and	effect	is	introduced	by	the	knowing	subject	into	the	object	itself,	making	this	
necessity	objective,	that	is	true	of	the	object	of	experience.8		In	the	same	way	in	which	in	
the	epigenesis	metaphor	parents	contribute	to	the	production	of	a	new	individual,	the	
Copernican	turn	introduced	by	Kant	in	his	Deduction	explains	how	an	object	is	constituted	
by	the	knowing	subject	on	the	basis	of	the	manifold	provided	by	the	senses.		Accordingly,	it	
is	the	a	priori	concept	that	makes	possible	the	object.		This	is	the	classical	way	of	reading	
the	analogy	of	epigenesis	in	§27,	and	it	is,	in	my	eyes,	a	perfectly	legitimate	one:	the	
productive	process	concerns	not	so	much	the	genesis	of	the	pure	concepts	as	the	
constitution	of	experience.		We	must	now	turn	to	the	tertium	comparationis	itself,	
epigenesis,	whose	adoption	in	Kant's	philosophical	development	takes	place	before	the	
discovery	of	critical	philosophy.	
	
2-Kant's	adoption	of	the	biological	theory	of	epigenesis	
	
	 In	his	Beweisgrund	of	1762,	Kant	comes	to	consider	the	various	ways	of	interpreting	
the	relation	between	the	world	and	its	Creator.		In	the	"Fourth	Consideration"	dealing	with	
the	use	that	can	be	made	of	his	newly	established	Beweisgrund	with	regard	to	the	
perfection	of	the	world,	Kant	faces	the	problem	of	the	generation	of	plants	and	animals.		In	
fact,	he	has	the	choice	between	the	two	main	biological	theories	of	his	century:	
preformation	and	epigenesis.		They	are	so	well	known	that	he	does	not	even	bother	to	
																																																																				
8	See	Kant,	Metaphysische	Anfangsgründe	der	Naturwissenschaft,	AK	IV,	476,	note.	In	this	
long	note,	Kant	reacts	to	the	criticism	of	the	anonymous	reviewer	of	J.	A.	H.	Ulrich's	book	
Institutiones	Logicae	et	Metaphysicae	who	took	aim	at	the	transcendental	Deduction	by	
raising	anew	the	argument	of	a	pre-established	harmony	between	representations	and	
their	object	in	experience.		To	be	sure,	the	fact	that	Kant	returns	to	the	problem	of	
preformation	in	§27	of	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	is	certainly	motivated,	at	least	in	part,	by	
the	will	to	give	a	final	answer	to	the	objection	made	in	this	review.		See	Hans-Ulrich	
Baumgarten,	"Kant	und	das	Problem	einer	prästabilierten	Harmonie.		Überlegungen	zur	
Transzendentalen	Deduktion	der	Verstandeskategorien,"	Zeitschrift	für	philosophische	
Forschung	51	(1997):	411-426.	[Note	of	2019	:	see	also	my	«	Feder	et	Kant	en	1787.		Le	§27	
de	la	Déduction	transcendantale	»	(2002)	on	Papyrus	in	a	near	future.]	
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mention	them	by	name.9		He	simply	asks	if	the	broad	principle	of	the	unity	of	nature	(i.e.	
simplicity	of	the	means),	that	has	become	pervasive	in	physics,	can	also	be	applied	to	the	
world	of	organic	products.		The	question	amounts	to	this:	is	it	possible	to	maintain	the	
intervention	of	the	supernatural	at	a	minimum,	especially	in	the	field	of	the	generation	of	
living	beings?	
	 Kant	begins	by	attacking	a	biological	version	of	occasionalism	according	to	which	
God	has	to	intervene	at	the	occasion	of	each	and	every	copulation	in	order	to	introduce	life	
in	the	embryo.		This	is	a	most	obvious	abuse	of	the	supernatural	in	biology.		But,	all	things	
considered,	Kant	concludes	that	the	theory	of	preformation	is	not	in	a	better	position,	
because	the	recourse	to	God	is	as	important	here	as	in	the	case	of	the	occasional	causes,	the	
difference	being	in	preformationism	that	the	divine	intervention	is	concentrated	at	the	time	
of	the	creation	of	the	world,	when	all	virtual	living	organisms	are	engendered.		There	is	no	
economy	of	supernatural	causes	in	the	theory	of	preformation	because	no	substantial	role	
is	conferred	upon	nature	in	the	course	of	things.		This	theory	does	not	conform	to	the	"rule	
of	the	fruitfulness	of	nature",	which	is	among	the	criteria	retained	by	Kant	in	his	adoption	
of	epigenesis,	that	is,	the	theory	in	virtue	of	which	individual	products	do	not	
"immediately"	proceed	from	the	hands	of	God.	
		It	seems	inevitable	either	to	attribute	the	formation	of	the	fruit	on	the	occasion	of	
every	copulation	immediately	to	a	divine	operation,	or	to	distinguish	within	the	first	
divine	ordering	of	plants	and	animals	a	capacity	not	only	to	develop	their	offsprings	
but	to	produce	them	in	the	first	place.10	
The	main	theoretical	advantage	of	epigenesis	is	clearly	stated:	the	"productive"	aspect	
relies	on	a	capacity	(Tauglichkeit)	of	the	natural	organism.		The	fruitfulness	of	nature	
however	is	not	an	arbitrary	process	of	creation,	since	the	generation	of	a	new	individual	is	
guided	by	"natural	laws",	which	are,	one	must	admit,	much	harder	to	trace	in	biology	than	
in	physics.	
	 Kant's	choice,	therefore,	is	not	based	on	experimental	observation.		He	is	fully	aware	
that	biologists	like	Buffon	and	Maupertius	whom	he	mentions	in	passing	are	working	with	
mere	hypotheses.		In	consequence	of	the	enormous	difficulties	(Schwierigkeiten)	met	in	the	
																																																																				
9	See	Erich	Adickes,	Kant	als	Naturforscher,	Band	II	(Berlin:	de	Gruyter,	1925),	427-428;	
François	Jacob,	La	logique	du	vivant.		Une	histoire	de	l'hérédité	(Paris:	Gallimard,	1970),	63-
78;	Peter	McLaughlin,	Kant's	Critique	of	Teleology	in	Biological	Explanation.		Antinomy	and	
Teleology	(Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter:	The	Edwin	Mellen	Press,	1990),	7-24.	
10	Kant,	Der	Einzig	mögliche	Beweisgrund	zur	einer	Demonstration	des	Daseins	Gottes	
(hereafter	Beweisgrund),	AK	II,	115.		
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field	of	experience,	Kant	claims	that	he	bases	his	preference	for	epigenesis	not	on	empirical	
evidence,	but	rather	on	"metaphysical"	considerations.11		He	does	not	expose	these	
considerations	in	the	text	of	the	Beweisgrund,	but	they	have	to	do	with	the	principle	of	the	
unity	of	nature,	that	is,	of	a	nature	resting	on	universal	laws.		In	fact,	these	metaphysical	
options	are	taken	quite	early	in	Kant's	philosophical	journey.		For	instance,	in	the	Nova	
Dilucidatio	of	1755,	we	find	an	explicit	criticism	of	Malebranche's	theory	of	the	occasional	
causes	as	well	as	of	Leibniz'	conception	of	pre-established	harmony,	a	criticism	made	from	
the	standpoint	of	a	revised	version	of	the	theory	of	physical	influence	between	substances	
in	the	world.12		The	advantage	of	the	renewed	theory	of	real	influence	is	that	the	relation	
between	the	substances	are	regulated	by	nature	itself	according	to	fixed	laws,	whereas	
occasionalism	and	pre-established	harmony	leave	the	mere	consensus	between	the	
substances	to	God's	will.		Still	in	§22	of	the	Dissertation,	Kant	levels	the	same	attack	against	
Malebranche	and	Leibniz	in	the	name	of	the	regulas	communes	that	orchestrate	the	
dynamic	relations	between	the	substances.13		The	consequences	of	this	early	metaphysical	
option	concerning	substances	in	the	world	are	such	that	he	will	return	to	it	in	the	critical	
system.		Hence,	it	will	come	as	no	surprise	that	the	theoretical	structure	of	§81	of	the	
Critique	of	Judgment	entitled	Von	der	Beigesellung	des	Mechanismus	zu	teleologischen	
Prinzipien	in	der	Erklärung	eines	Naturzweckes	als	Naturproduktes	finds	its	clear	
anticipation	in	the	quoted	passages	of	the	Beweisgrund	and	of	the	Dissertation,	although	
they	are	reinterpreted	in	terms	of	a	regulative	teleological	judgment.	
	
3-Epigenesis	as	an	epistemological	Model	in	the	seventies	
	
	 In	a	Reflexion	written	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	Dissertation,	the	
epistemological	metaphor	of	epigenesis	is	expressed	in	a	way	that	will	remain	
paradigmatic	for	all	the	other	occurrences	in	Kant's	personal	notes	of	the	seventies.		As	in	
these	other	cases,	he	first	refers	to	various	theories	associated	with	the	names	of	their	main	
proponents	(most	of	the	time,	Plato,	Malebranche,	Locke	and	Crusius)	before	proposing	his	
own	theory.	
		Crusius	explains	the	real	principles	of	reason	according	to	the	system	of	
preformation	(on	the	basis	of	subjective	principles),	Locke	according	to	physical	
																																																																				
11	Beweisgrund,	AK	II,	114.		
12	Kant,	Nova	Dilucidatio,	AK	I,	415-416.	
13	Kant,	Dissertation,	§22,	AK	II,	409.	
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influx	like	Aristotle,	Plato	and	Malebranche	according	to		intellectual	intuition,	we	
for	our	part	according	to	epigenesis	on	the	basis	of	the	use	of	the	natural	laws	of	
reason.14	
The	metaphorical	use	of	epigenesis	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	here.		In	fact,	in	the	year	
before	the	defence	of	his	Dissertation,	Kant	did	not	hesitate	in	another	Reflexion	to	use	the	
term	as	a	possible	candidate	to	answer	the	metaphysical	question	of	the	origin	of	the	
human	soul.		All	things	considered,	the	reference	to	an	epigenesis	intellectualis	of	the	
principles	of	reason	is	no	more	strange	than	the	allusion	to	an	epigenesis	psychologica.		The	
latter	is	just	an	hypothetical	explanation	that	Kant	will	later	reject,	on	the	ground	that	it	is	
impossible	to	conceive	how	the	soul	of	the	two	parents	could	create	a	new	soul	without	
invoking	a	creatio	ex	nihilo.15			
	 The	first	question	that	requires	an	answer	concerning	the	Reflexion	quoted	above	is	
the	following:	does	the	allusion	to	an	intellectual	epigenesis	in	the	early	seventies	refer	
back	to	the	discussion	of	the	Dissertation,	or	does	it	anticipate	the	thesis	of	§27	of	the	
Critique	of	Pure	Reason?		In	other	words,	is	the	metaphor	employed	in	Reflexion	§	4275	
appropriate	to	depict	the	precritical	position	of	Kant	in	the	Dissertation	concerning	the	
origin	of	pure	concepts,	or	does	it	announce	the	Copernican	Revolution	that	starts	with	the	
crucial	question	raised	in	the	letter	to	Herz	of	February	21,	1772?			If	we	examine	the	
Reflexionen	written	in	the	decade	following	the	publication	of	the	Dissertation,	we	notice	a	
tendency	that	is	best	expressed	by	a	note	dating	from	1776-1778.		Kant	proceeds	to	the	
enumeration,	in	Latin,	of	the	four	theories	enplaning	the	origin	of	our	concepts:	"1.	per	
intuitionem	mysticam.	2.	(influxum)	sensitivum.	3.	per	praeformationem.	4.	per	epigenesin	
intellectualem..."16		These	four	theories	can	easily	be	related	respectively	to	Plato,	Locke,	
Crusius	and	Kant.		But	what	is	most	interesting	is	that	the	four	possible	explanations	are	
placed	under	the	heading:	"origin	of	transcendental	concepts".		Kant	seems	to	be	
preoccupied	first	of	all	with	the	sources	of	the	concepts	of	the	understanding,	and	not	with	
their	application,	as	will	be	the	case	in	the	first	Critique.		If	in	another	notation	he	aligns	(as	
is	typical	of	the	Reflexionen)	the	two	pairs	of	opposition	"educta	or	producta",	
																																																																				
14	Refl.	§	4275	(1770-1771),	AK	XVII,	492;	for	a	contemporary	variation	of	the	same,	see	
Refl.	§	4446	(1769-1772?),	AK	XVII,	554.	
15	Refl.	§	4104	(1769-1770),	AK	XVIII,	416;	see	also	Refl.	§	4446	(1769-1772?),	and	
Vorlesungen	über	Metaphysik	(K2),	AK	XXVIII-2.1,	760-762;	Reinhard	Löw,	Philosophie	des	
Lebendigen.	Der	Begriff	des	Organischen	bei	Kant,	sein	Grund	und	seine	Aktualität	(Frankfurt:	
Suhrkamp,	1980),	179.	
16	Refl.	§	4859	(1776-1778),	AK	XVIII,	12.	
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"praeformation	and	epigenesis",	it	is	to	associate	them,	a	few	lines	later	to	the	opposition	
"ideae	connatae...	acquisitae".17		From	this,	we	can	conclude	that	the	intent	of	the	
contradistinction	of	the	two	biological	metaphors,	preformation	and	epigenesis,	pertains	to	
the	means	by	which	the	understanding	comes	into	possession	of	its	pure	concepts.		Now,	
Kant	claims	that	the	pure	concepts	of	the	understanding	are	not	innate,	but	acquired.	
	 That	Kant	is	concerned	by	the	problem	of	the	sources	of	the	concepts	of	metaphysics	
can	be	drawn	from	the	criticism	that	he	addresses	to	Crusius	in	the	Reflexionen	of	the	
seventies.		Instead	of	stressing	the	fact	that	the	theory	of	preformation	makes	it	impossible	
to	explain	the	objective	necessity	taking	place	in	experience,	he	insists	on	what	in	§27	of	
the	Critique	appears	as	a	subsidiary	remark:	if	the	principles	and	concepts	of	the	
understanding	were	implanted	in	us	by	the	Creator,	we	could	not	establish	with	certainty	
how	many	such	innate	concepts	are	to	be	found	in	the	mind.	In	fact,	the	philosopher	could	
never	know	if	a	concept	discovered	within	consciousness	is	innate,	and	therefore	
warranted	by	God,	or	if	it	comes	from	somewhere	else	and	therefore	might	possibly	be	
deceptive.18		
	 This	means	that	Kant	has	recourse	to	epigenesis	only	to	draw	attention	to	the	fact	
that	the	concepts	of	the	understanding	are	acquired	and	not	innate,	meaning	by	this	
metaphor	that	all	those	pure	concepts	must	be	produced	in	the	first	place.		There	is	a	cue	in	
the	Reflexion	§	4275	quoted	earlier	and	which	relates	epigenesis	to	the	problematic	of	the	
Dissertation:	it	is	to	be	found	in	the	final	words:	epigenesis	aus	dem	Gebrauch	der	
natürlichen	Gesetze	der	Vernunft.		By	this	remark,	Kant	recognises	that	the	only	things	in	
the	mind	that	are	innate	are	the	laws	of	reason,	not	its	concepts.		This	means	that	the	
knowing	subject	does	not	initially	have	a	representation	of	the	concepts	related	to	these	
laws.		These	laws	remain	hidden	in	the	mind	as	long	as	they	are	not	put	into	use,	and	it	is	
only	when	they	come	into	play	that	consciousness	through	a	process	of	abstraction	can	
gain	a	representation	of	them.		This	was	the	explicit	theory	of	the	Dissertation	concerning	
the	origin	of	what	will	later	be	called	the	categories.	
		...the	concepts	occurring	in	it	[metaphysics]	must	not	be	sought	in	the	senses,	but	
rather	in	the	nature	itself	of	pure	understanding,	not	as	innate	concepts,	but	as	
concepts	which	are	abstracted	from	the	laws	implanted	in	the	faculty	of	knowledge	
(when	we	pay	attention	to	its	operations	on	the	occasion	of	experience)	and	which	
																																																																				
17	Refl.	§	4851	(1776-1778),	AK	XVIII,	8;		see	also	Refl.	§	5637	(1780-1783?;	1790?),	AK	
XVIII,	275.	
18	Refl.	§	4893	(1776-1778?),	Bd.	XVIII,	21.	
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are	therefore	acquired.		Of	this	sort	are	"possibility",	"actuality",	"necessity",	
"substance",	"cause"	etc.19		
Kant	has	been	careful	enough	to	explain	in	§6	that	the	process	of	abstracting	which	takes	
place	"at	the	occasion	of	the	experience"	does	not	here	lead	to	an	empirical	concept.		He	
insists	that	the	mind	can	abstract	from	everything	empirical	in	a	representation	and	focus	
exclusively	on	the	intellectual	elements	of	it.		This	is	precisely	the	process	described	in	the	
passage	just	quoted.20		In	the	Dissertation,	Kant	is	busy	preventing	the	"contamination"	of	
metaphysical	knowledge	by	empirical	elements.		He	wants	to	reserve	an	autonomous	
sphere	for	metaphysics,	independently	of	any	sensible	knowledge.		To	put	it	bluntly,	he	
wants	to	make	use	of	a	set	of	pure	concepts	allowing	for	a	knowledge	of	the	things	as	they	
are	"in	themselves"	(objecta	ipsa,	§24).		And	it	is	precisely	in	this	precritical	context,	so	it	is	
my	claim,	that	the	early	recourse	to	epigenesis	takes	place.		This	can	be	confirmed	by	the	
way	Kant	treats	the	symmetrical	case	of	sensible	knowledge	in	the	Dissertation.		In	fact,	the	
same	process	of	abstraction	applies	for	the	pure	intuitions	of	space	and	time,	although	they	
make	--	contrary	to	intellectual	knowledge	--	a	first	step	toward	the	Copernican	
Revolution.21		Kant	says	explicitly	that	time	and	space	make	possible	the	representation	of	a	
sensible	object,	that	they	are	constitutive	of	the	very	possibility	of	something	like	an	
empirical	object	for	the	human	mind.		However,	when	Kant	comes	back	to	the	acquisition	of	
these	intuitions	at	the	end	of	the	chapter	on	the	sensible	world,	he	does	not	feel	the	need	to	
establish	a	link	between	the	process	of	epigenesis	taking	place	in	the	«acquisition"	of	these	
pure	representations,	and	the	fact	that	they	are	constitutive	a	priori	of	every	sensible	
object.		Here	also	the	question	of	the	origin	of	the	representation	of	space	and	time	remains	
independent	of	the	question	of	objective	validity.	
	 Before	returning	to	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	there	is	a	question	which	inevitably	
comes	to	mind,	and	which	deserves	an	answer.		The	enumeration	of	the	names	Plato,	
Malebranche,	Locke	and	Crusius	that	are	recurrent	in	the	Reflexionen	of	the	seventies,	
reminds	us	of	the	famous	letter	to	Markus	Herz	of	February	21,	1772.		The	question	is	the	
following:	if	Kant	is	already	in	possession	of	his	metaphor	when	he	writes	his	letter,	why	
does	he	not	communicate	it	to	Herz	in	order	to	state	his	own	opinion?		Do	we	have	to	
																																																																				
19	Dissertation,	§	8,	AK	II,	395.	
20	Dissertation,	§	6,	AK	II,	394.	
21	See	Gordon	Treash,	"Kant	and	Crusius.	Epigenesis	and	Preformation,"	in	Proceedings	of	
the	Sixth	International	Kant	Congress	[1985],	vol.	II,	part	1,	ed.	G.	Funke	&	T.	Seebohm	
(Washington:	The	University	Press	of	America,	1989),	102.	
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conclude	that	there	is	a	mistake	on	the	part	of	Adickes	in	his	dating	of	the	Reflexionen	on	
epigenesis	attributed	to	the	period	before	1772?		Or	rather,	does	the	answer	lay	in	the	
specific	question	that	is	raised	in	his	letter	to	Herz?		I	think	that	the	solution	is	to	be	found	
in	the	second	alternative.		In	his	letter,	Kant	glances	over	what	has	been	done	so	far,	and	
what	still	lays	ahead.		The	following	sentence	has	become	very	famous:	
		I	was	satisfied	in	the	Dissertation	to	express	the	nature	of	the	intellect	in	purely	
negative	terms:	namely	that	they	[concepts	of	the	understanding]	were	not	
modifications	of	the	soul	produced	by	the	object.		The	problem,	however,	which	I	
passed	over	in	silence,	is	how,	then,	a	representation	which	is	related	to	an	object	
can	otherwise	possibly	exist,	without	being	affected	by	it	in	some	way.22	
Kant	wants	to	entertain	his	correspondent	about	the	work	ahead,	that	is,	about	this	last	
question.		He	does	not	need	to	remind	his	reader,	who	had	served	as	his	"respondent"	
during	the	defence	of	his	Dissertation,	of	his	theory	of	the	active	acquisition	of	pure	
representations.		Herz	does	not	require	the	help	of	a	metaphor	because	he	is	already	
entirely	familiar	with	the	previous	work	done	by	Kant.		And	Kant	for	his	part	cannot	
introduce	the	epigenesis	after	the	theories	of	Plato,	Malebranche	and	Crusius,	because	
epigenesis	is	no	solution	at	all	with	respect	to	the	issue	raised	in	the	passage	in	question.		In	
1772,	Kant	does	not	have	an	answer	to	the	problem	on	which	he	draws	the	attention	of	
Herz,	namely	the	problem	of	the	objective	validity	of	pure	representations,	of	the	necessary	
relation	between	an	intellectual	representation	and	its	object.		Immediately	after	the	
mention	of	Crusius'	harmonia	praestablita	intellectualis,	Kant	continues:	"However,	in	the	
determination	of	the	origin	and	of	the	validity	of	our	knowledge,	the	Deus	ex	machina	is	the	
most	foolish	explanation	that	one	can	choose..."		Of	the	two	issues	raised	here,	"origin"	and	
"validity",	Kant	has	already	solved	the	first	to	his	satisfaction	--	which	can	be	expressed	in	
terms	of	epigenesis	--	but	he	is	far	from	having	accomplished	with	the	pure	concepts	of	the	
understanding	the	revolution	that	will	allow	him	to	discover	that	the	categories	are	
constitutive	of	the	very	possibility	of	experience.		Even	after	the	crucial	steps	taken	toward	
a	theory	of	synthetic	judgments	in	the	Duisburgsche	Nachlass	of	the	mid-seventies,	the	
specific	role	of	the	imagination	in	knowledge	is	still	to	be	discovered.		So	it	becomes	
conceivable	that	the	use	of	epigenesis	even	in	the	second	half	of	the	seventies	still	refers	to	
his	theory	of	acquisition	reached	in	the	Dissertation.	
	
4-The	two	strands	of	the	argument	of	epigenesis	in	§27	
																																																																				
22	Kant,	Letter	to	Markus	Herz	of	February	21,	1772,	AK	X,	130-131	(trans.	Kerferd	&	
Walford).	
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	 So	far,	the	metaphor	of	epigenesis	has	been	examined	in	two	different	contexts.		
First,	as	an	expression	of	the	Copernican	Revolution	taking	place	in	the	Critique	(§27),	and	
second,	as	an	illustration	of	the	manner	in	which	the	intellectus,	as	it	was	conceived	at	the	
time	of	the	Dissertation,	comes	to	the	representation	of	its	pure	concepts.		In	the	first	case,	
epigenesis	depicts	the	production	of	the	experience	through	pure	concepts,	and	in	the	
second,	the	metaphor	expresses	the	process	of	acquisition	through	which	the	concepts	of	
the	understanding	are	arrived	at.		To	be	sure,	these	are	certainly	two	different	lines	of	
argumentation,	corresponding	to	two	different	periods	in	Kant's	development,	but	I	would	
now	like	to	argue	that	the	precritical	use	of	the	metaphor	of	epigenesis	in	the	Reflexionen	of	
the	seventies	leaves	traces	in	§27	itself.		This	does	not	mean	to	say	that	the	standard	
interpretation	of	the	paragraph	according	to	which	the	categories	are	productive	in	that	
they	first	make	experience	possible	is	not	accurate.		However,	the	commentators	have	
tended	to	neglect	the	other	line	of	argumentation	that	is	still	present	in	the	text	and,	what	is	
more,	is	part	of	Kant's	intention	in	this	closing	section	of	the	Transcendental	Deduction.	
	
	 We	must	remember	that,	shortly	before	Kant	introduces	the	metaphors	of	generatio	
aequivoca	and	of	epigenesis	in	§27,	he	was	stressing	the	fact	that	the	pure	concepts	of	the	
understanding	are	not	"derived	from	experience";	rather,	that	they	are	"found	in	us	a	
priori".		The	pure	origin	of	the	categories	is	certainly	part	of	his	argument	in	the	Deduction	
and	he	is	interested	in	pointing	out	this	fact	once	more.		Hence,	the	rejected	empirical	
explanation	illustrated	by	the	generatio	aequivoca	and	according	to	which	it	is	experience	
that	makes	a	priori	concepts	possible,	is	a	tentative	solution	that	deals	explicitly	with	the	
problem	of	the	"origin".		So	it	might	be	suspected	that	the	other	explanation	also	has	
something	to	do	with	finding	the	true	source	of	the	pure	concepts.		In	fact,	both	metaphors,	
epigenesis	and	generatio	aequivoca,	deal	explicitly,	or	better,	etymologically,	with	the	
problem	of	the	origin.		And	in	the	case	of	epigenesis,	my	claim	is	that	the	"production"	
implied	by	this	metaphor	does	not	pertain	primarily	to	the	production	of	experience,	but	to	
the	a	priori	concepts	as	such.	
	 Let	us	read	the	lines	in	which	Kant	exposes	the	three	possible	explanations	for	the	
origin	of	the	categories	in	§27.	
		A	middle	course	may	be	proposed	between	the	above	mentioned,	namely,	that	the	
categories	are	neither	self-thought	first	principles	a	priori	of	our	knowledge	nor	
derived	from	experience,	but	subjective	dispositions	of	thought,	implanted	in	us	
from	the	first	moment	of	our	existence,	and	so	ordered	by	the	Creator	that	their	
employment	is	in	complete	harmony	with	the	laws	of	nature	in	accordance	with	
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which	experience	proceeds	--	a	kind	of	preformation-system	of	pure	reason.23		
What	is	remarkable	about	this	passage	is	that	the	two	first	modes	of	explanation	
mentioned	by	Kant	refer	explicitly	to	an	activity	made	use	of	by	the	knowing	subject.		For	
the	empiricist,	the	concept	must	be	"derived"	from	experience	in	that	it	must	literally	be	
drawn	(geschöpft)	from	the	manifold	offered	by	the	senses.	Yet	if	the	empirical	theory	of	
the	origin	of	concepts	implies	a	process,	the	same	is	true	for	Kant's	theory	of	epigenesis,	
and	this	is	confirmed	by	the	fact	that	the	word	"self-thought"	appears	in	italics	in	the	
passage	quoted	above.		This	means	to	say	that	for	Kant	no	completely	formed	concept	can	
be	found	as	such	in	the	mind.		Even	the	concepts	that	he	considers	to	be	"given",	be	they	a	
posteriori	or	a	priori,	must	be	the	result	of	a	certain	process	of	acquisition.		That	is,	they	
must	be	acquired	either	out	of	the	materials	provided	by	the	senses,	or	out	of	the	laws	of	
the	mind	itself	--	and	be	therefore	self-thought.24		Compared	to	those	two	first	explanations,	
the	innateness	of	the	categories	as	proposed	by	Crusius	is	deprived	of	this	active	
dimension.		According	to	this	theory,	the	concepts	are	"implanted"	in	the	mind	by	a	foreign	
hand,	and	Kant	has	always	considered	that	such	a	theory	of	innateness	leads	the	
philosopher	to	laziness,	when	it	does	not	lead	him	directly	to	mystic	speculation	and	
Schwärmerei.	
	 If	we	want	to	convince	ourselves	that	Kant's	theory	of	acquisition	of	the	pure	
concepts	is	still	valid	for	critical	philosophy,	we	may	turn	to	a	text	written	three	years	after	
the	second	edition	of	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason.		In	his	reply	to	an	objection	of	Eberhard	
who	continues	to	regard	space	and	time	as	innate,	Kant	reiterates	his	theory	of	acquisition.		
For	him,	time	and	space	as	well	as	the	pure	concepts	of	the	understanding	can	only	become	
representations	after	having	been	properly	acquired	by	the	knowing	subject.		Kant	calls	
such	a	process	acquisitio	originaria	as	opposed	to	acquisitio	derivativa,	which	characterises	
empiricist	theories	of	a	Lockean	type.25		The	theory	of	originary	acquisition	corresponds	to	
																																																																				
23	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft,	B	167.	
24	Even	though	Kant	in	the	wake	of	the	Dissertation	(1771)	clearly	makes	the	distinction	
between	the	concepts	of	reason	that	are	"given"	a	priori	and	those,	like	the	Idea	of	God	and	
of	the	wise	man	according	to	the	Stoics,	"invented"	(facti,	sive	ficti)	a	priori,	he	nevertheless	
concedes	that	the	given	concepts	of	"pure	reason"	are	produced	(hervorgebracht).		This	
corresponds	to	the	word	"self-thought"	(selbstgedacht)	met	in	the	passage	cited	from	§	27	
of	the	first	Critique.		See	Kant,	Vorlesungen	über	Logik	(Blomberg).	AK	XXIV.1,	252-253,	262.		
For	a	study	of	the	"fictions"	that	are	at	the	basis	of	the	Ideas	of	pure	reason,	see	my	Das	
Ideal:	ein	Problem	der	Kantischen	Ideenlehre	(Bonn:	Bouvier,	1984).	
25	Kant,	Über	eine	Entdeckung,	nach	der	alle	neue	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft	durch	eine	ältere	
entbehrlich	gemacht	werden	soll,	AK	VIII,	222-223.		See	also	Kant's	letter	to	J.	W.	A.	
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a	procedure	already	present	in	the	Dissertation,	as	we	have	witnessed	above.		The	
difference	between	the	two	recourses	to	this	theory	is	evidently	related	to	their	respective	
contexts.		This	can	best	be	expressed	by	the	diverging	acceptance	of	the	expression	"on	the	
occasion	of	experience".		In	1770,	empirical	experience	just	provides	the	occasion	(occasio)	
to	look	closely	at	the	actions	and	the	laws	of	the	faculty	of	knowledge.		But	the	concepts	
that	are	attained	in	this	way	do	not	depict	the	properties	of	the	empirical	objects,	but	
rather	the	metaphysical	properties	of	the	objects	considered	in	themselves.		In	the	critical	
period,	on	the	other	hand,	the	expression	"on	the	occasion	of	the	experience"	has,	as	we	
might	suspect,	a	much	stronger	sense:	the	categories	of	the	understanding	do	not	merely	
emerge	on	the	occasion	of	the	experience.		They	are	constitutive	of	the	object	of	experience	
itself,	and	it	is	by	scrutinizing	the	operations	of	the	understanding,	or,	as	Kant	says	in	his	
reply	to	Eberhard,	by	observing	the	"subjective	conditions	of	the	spontaneity	of	thought	
(conformity	with	the	unity	of	apperception)"	that	we	produce	the	representation	of	these	
pure	concepts.26		In	both	contexts,	the	process	of	acquisition	is	similar,	while	the	use	of	
these	concepts	of	the	understanding	differs	drastically:	in	the	first	case,	the	use	is	dogmatic,	
in	the	second,	it	is	critical.	
	 In	the	Dissertation,	Kant	could	claim	that	his	theory	of	originary	acquisition	was	a	
novelty	in	that	it	provided	an	alternative	to	the	empiricist	theory	of	derivative	acquisition,	
without	having	recourse	to	the	innateness	of	our	a	priori	concepts.		However	different	both	
ways	of	conceiving	acquisition	may	be,	Kant	praises	Locke	for	having	raised	seriously	the	
philosophical	question	about	the	origin	of	concepts	in	general.		In	Reflexion	§	4894,	we	can	
read:	"Because	he	did	not	consider	the	intellectualia	to	be	innate,	Locke	distinguished	
himself	by	the	fact	that	he	searched	for	their	origin".27		And	in	this,	Locke	shows	his	
superiority	over	a	rationalist	like	Wolff,	for	example,	who	leaves	the	matter	completely	
unsettled.		Now,	the	same	preoccupation	for	the	origin	of	the	pure	concepts	of	the	
understanding	can	be	found	in	the	Critique,	and,	more	precisely,	in	the	chapter	entitled	
"Amphiboly	of	the	pure	concepts	of	reflection".		After	all,	in	order	to	establish	the	
possibility	of	knowledge	a	priori,	the	Critique	must	secure	the	purity	of	origin	of	such	
knowledge.		This	is	a	preliminary	task	that	was	undertaken	in	the	Dissertation,	but	which	is	
																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
Kosmann,	September	1789,	AK	XI,	82.	
26	Dissertation,	§	8,	AK	II,	395;	in	1770,	experience	is	there	only	to	provoke	(excitare)	the	
search	for	pure	concepts,	cf.	ibid.,	§15,	AK	II,	406.		Refl.	§	3930	(1769),	AK	XVII,	352.		Kritik	
der	reinen	Vernunft,	A	66/B	91.	Über	eine	Entdeckung...,	AK	VIII,	223.	
27	See	also	Refl.	§	4866	(1776-1778),	AK	XVIII,	14.	
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still	essential	for	the	transcendental	foundation	of	knowledge.		Here	it	involves	an	
operation	called	reflection.		Therefore,	the	Amphiboly	chapter	begins	with	the	following	
sentence:	
		Reflection	(reflexio)	does	not	concern	itself	with	objects	themselves	with	a	view	to	
deriving	concepts	from	them	directly,	but	it	is	a	state	of	mind	in	which	we	first	set	
ourselves	to	discover	the	subjective	conditions	under	which	[alone]	we	are	able	to	
arrive	at	concepts.28	
It	is	no	wonder	then	that	this	chapter	of	the	Critique	is	turned	against	Leibniz,	who,	like	
most	rationalist	philosophers,	are	not	at	first	preoccupied	with	the	origin	of	the	
representations	they	are	dealing	with.		In	fact,	it	is	because	of	Locke's	provocation	that	
Leibniz	was	forced	in	his	New	Essays	on	Human	Understanding	to	begin	his	discussion	by	
addressing	the	problem	of	innate	ideas.			
	
	 Before	ending	our	examination	of	the	use	of	the	metaphor	of	epigenesis	in	§27	of	the	
Critique,	it	might	be	interesting	to	question	the	ultimate	significance	of	Kant's	recourse	to	a	
vocabulary	stemming	from	natural	history.		After	all,	epigenesis	is	not	here	associated	with	
a	mere	detail	in	the	Critique.		On	the	contrary,	Kant	speaks	emphatically	of	an	"epigenesis-
system	of	pure	reason".		Consequently,	the	metaphor	touches	pure	reason	in	its	essence.		
This	means	that	pure	reason,	as	a	"faculty",	can	be	considered	in	terms	of	its	development	
and	of	its	own	finality.		To	be	sure,	the	issue	of	the	teleology	of	pure	reason	(teleologia	
rationis	humanae)	is	explicitly	raised	in	the	Critique,	but	it	has	a	twofold	meaning.29		On	the	
one	hand,	the	finality	of	reason	can	refer	to	the	goals	that	reason	might	set	itself	
consciously	and	deliberately.		This	is	the	case	for	instance	of	the	subtitle	that	we	find	in	the	
section	devoted	to	the	Canon	of	pure	reason:	"The	Ideal	of	the	Highest	Good,	as	a	
Determining	Ground	of	the	Ultimate	End	of	pure	Reason".		On	the	other	hand,	there	is	in	the	
Critique	an	extensive	reference	to	teleology	that	merely	concerns	reason	as	a	product	of	
nature.		In	this	sense,	the	finality	of	reason	as	a	faculty	is	one	that	was	imprinted	on	it	by	
"nature",	if	we	understand	this	term	in	the	widest	possible	meaning.	In	other	words,	the	
teleology	of	reason	in	this	case	can	be	attributed	to	a	nature	interpreted	in	the	same	sense	
as	in	the	text	on	the	Idea	of	a	Universal	History	from	a	Cosmopolitan	Point	of	View,	that	is,	as	
Providence.30		This	comes	out	clearly	in	other	passages	of	the	Critique	such	as,	for	example,	
																																																																				
28	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft,	A	260/B	316,	emphasis	mine.	
29	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft,	A	839/B	867.	
30	Kant,	Idee	zu	einer	allgemeinen	Geschichte	in	weltbürgerlicher	Absicht,	AK	VIII,	30.	
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the	chapter	in	which	Kant	states	the	positive	effects	of	the	Dialectic	of	pure	reason:	"The	
Final	Purpose	of	the	Natural	Dialectic	of	Human	Reason".		Here,	the	purposiveness	cannot	
be	attributed	to	the	will	of	the	protagonists	of	the	dialectical	debates	presented	in	the	
Antinomies,	because	no	one	would	willingly	accept	to	fall	prey	to	such	a	transcendental	
illusion.		The	purpose	is	rather	a	design	of	nature	and	it	aims	at	awakening	philosophers	
from	their	dogmatic	slumber.		Here	the	purpose	of	Providence	is	not	fundamentally	
different	from	the	finality	of	the	"ungesellige	Geselligkeit"	found	in	the	article	on	history.		
Human	beings	fall	into	the	intricacies	of	the	Antinomies	in	the	same	manner	as	they	
unwillingly	get	involved	in	wars.31		If	such	a	parallel	is	legitimate,	this	means	that	critical	
philosophy	relies	on	ultimate	metaphysical	premises	that	are	not	in	themselves	subjected	
to	philosophical	investigation,	simply	because	they	sustain	Kant's	critical	project	from	the	
beginning.		These	presuppositions	no	doubt	have	far-reaching	consequences,	if	only	it	can	
be	shown	that	they	are	determining	for	Kant's	conception	of	human	reason	as	a	whole.	
	 As	a	matter	of	fact,	Kant	did	not	wait	until	1787	to	introduce	biological	metaphors	
into	the	development	of	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason.		The	occurrence	of	the	theme	of	
epigenesis	in	§27	of	the	Deduction	is	just	one	more	reference	to	an	inner	teleology	of	
reason	that	was	already	at	work	in	the	first	edition.32		To	tell	the	truth,	the	epigenesis	of	the	
categories	had	been	anticipated	in	1781	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	Transcendental	
Analytic.		Kant	insists	on	specifying	that	these	concepts	find	their	"birthplace"	in	the	
understanding	"alone":		"We	shall	therefore	follow	up	the	pure	concepts	to	their	first	seeds	
and	dispositions	in	the	human	understanding,	in	which	they	lie	prepared,	till	at	last,	on	the	
occasion	of	experience,	they	are	developed..."33		This	sentence	helps	us	to	recapitulate	what	
is	at	stake	in	the	metaphor	of	epigenesis.		We	have	to	consider	that	even	though	Kant	
stresses	the	fact	that	epigenesis	makes	room	for	a	real	act	of	production	--	instead	of	a	
mere	eduction,	as	in	the	case	of	preformation	--	there	is	nevertheless	an	element	of	
																																																																				
31	See	my	«La	métaphore	de	la	guerre	et	du	tribunal	dans	la	philosophie	critique»,	in	
L'année	1795.		Kant,	essais	sur	la	paix,	ed.	P.	Laberge	et	al.	(Paris:	Vrin,	1997),	389-401.	
32		This	point	has	often	been	stressed	in	secondary	literature.		Lately,	Bernd	Dörflinger	has	
devoted	an	interersting	study	to	the	organic	metaphors	in	the	Deduction	of	the	categories	
in	relation	to	their	systematic	unity.		For	my	part,	as	it	has	now	become	obvious,	I	insist	on	
those	metaphors	in	relation	to	the	problem	of	origin.		See	Bernd	Dörflinger,	"The	
Underlying	Teleology	of	the	First	Critique,"	in	Proceedings	of	the	Eighth	International	Kant	
Congress	(1995),	vol.	I,	part	2,	ed.	H.	Robinson	(Milwaukee,	Marquette	University	Press,	
1995),	813-826.	
33	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft,	A	66/B	91.	
	 17	
predetermination	in	his	conception	of	epigenesis.		This	is	why	he	argues	that	nature	has	
placed	in	reason	the	seeds	and	dispositions	(Keime	und	Anlagen)	of	the	categories	in	order	
for	them	to	come	into	use	"on	the	occasion	of	experience"	and	become	representations.		
The	fact	that	they	"lie	prepared"	indicates	that	the	understanding	cannot	produce	these	
pure	originary	concepts	in	indefinite	number:	the	guidelines	have	been,	from	the	start,	
imprinted	in	the	mind.		This	is	the	reason	why	Kant	in	§81	of	the	Critique	of	Judgment	does	
not	hesitate	to	define	epigenesis,	not	as	an	arbitrary	production,	but,	much	to	our	surprise,	
in	terms	of	"preformation".		He	calls	it	"generic	preformation"	in	order	to	contrast	it	with	
"individual	preformation"	whereby	every	individual	of	the	species	is	totally	predetermined	
(Leibniz).		Generic	preformation,	as	opposed	to	the	pre-established	harmony	implied	in	
individual	preformation,	leaves	room	for	initiative,	for	a	real	act	of	production,	but	
initiative	according	to	a	finality	whose	broad	lines	are	set	in	advance.		From	the	point	of	
view	of	his	own	consciousness,	the	knowing	subject	conforms	himself	to	these	guidelines	
without	being	able	to	say	why	he	acts	according	to	these	specific	categories	and	no	others.		
This	matter	of	fact	is	purely	contingent.		Even	the	critical	philosopher	is	not	able	to	justify	
why	the	pure	forms	of	intuition	and	the	pure	concepts	of	the	understanding	are	such	and	
have	this	specific	number.		He	can	only	tell	the	knowing	subject	that	he	acts	each	time	
precisely	according	to	this	set	of	categories.34		As	for	the	initiative	left	to	the	individual	in	
the	theory	of	epigenesis,	Paul	Menzer	describes	it	in	terms	of	Spielraum.		See	his	Kants	
Lehre	von	der	Entwicklung	in	Natur	und	Geschichte	(Berlin:	Verlag	von	Georg	Reimer,	1911),	
106.			
	 If	we	consider	Kant's	critical	system	in	its	entirety,	we	come	to	realize	that	teleology	
is	not	only	present	in	the	first	and,	most	obviously,	in	the	third	Critique.		The	second	
Critique,	for	instance,	does	not	leave	the	human	freedom	to	act	totally	undetermined.		As	
the	writings	on	practical	philosophy	have	taught	us,	it	is	impossible	to	conceive	of	a	free	
will	that	would	be	deprived	of	any	law.35		Even	though	Kant	in	the	end	remains	incapable	of	
deducing	and	grounding	the	moral	law,	he	feels	obliged	to	admit	it	as	a	fact	of	reason,	as	a	
fact	that	specifies	the	ultimate	purpose	of	reason.		However,	this	purpose	is	no	
																																																																				
34	Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft,	B	145-146:	"The	peculiarity	of	our	understanding,	that	it	can	
produce	a	priori	unity	of	apperception	solely	by	means	of	the	categories,	and	only	by	such	
and	so	many,	is	as	little	capable	of	further	explanation	as	why	we	have	just	these	and	no	
other	functions	of	judgment,	or	why	space	and	time	are	the	only	forms	of	our	possible	
intuition."		On	this	topic,	see	P.	F.	Strawson,	"Sensibility,	Understanding,	and	the	Doctrine	of	
Synthesis:	Comments	on	Henrich	and	Guyer,"	in	Kant's	Transcendental	Deductions,	69-77.	
	
35	See	Kant,	Grundlegung	zur	Metaphysik	der	Sitten,	AK	IV,	446.	
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determination	in	the	sense	that	the	moral	agent	would	be	compelled	to	act	according	to	the	
good.		In	his	text	on	Religion,	for	instance,	Kant	refuses	to	admit	with	Rousseau	that	man	is	
good	"by	nature",	because	this	would	make	the	ascription	of	blame	impossible	and	deprive	
him	of	any	merit.		The	moral	law	does	not	determine	human	action	mechanistically	since	
this	would	manifestly	annihilate	any	claim	to	freedom.		This	is	well	known,	but	what	is	
often	neglected	is	the	fact	that	the	relation	of	man	to	moral	goodness	is	systematically	and	
carefully	described	by	Kant	in	terms	of	an	Anlage	:	disposition.		In	fact,	we	find	many	
occurrences	of	this	term	in	the	text	on	Religion.36		Such	a	reference	to	the	biological	term	
Anlage	is	crucial	to	Kant	insofar	as	it	makes	room	for	freedom	and	initiative,	that	is,	for	a	
free	production	of	the	good,	while	resisting	the	"inclination"	(Hang)	to	the	bad.		Goodness	is	
certainly	not	"innate"	to	human	beings,	but	the	disposition	to	goodness	is.		To	be	sure,	the	
designation	of	goodness	as	a	disposition	in	human	beings	certainly	comes	late	in	Kant's	
development;	it	is	nevertheless	symptomatic	of	the	way	in	which	he	envisages	the	teleology	
inherent	in	human	reason.		This	faculty	is	endowed	with	a	telos,	but	it	is	up	to	the	human	
being	to	realise	it.		Therefore,	the	initiative	left	to	the	individual	in	the	biological	theory	of	
epigenesis	can	count	as	a	paradigm	for	pure	reason	as	a	whole.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																																				
36	Kant,	Die	Religion	innerhalb	der	Grenzen	der	blossen	Vernunft,	AK	VI.		Here	are	a	few	of	
these	occurrences:	20,	28,	32,	36,	43.	
